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S.E. Nepstad. Nonviolent revolutions: Civil resistance in the late 20th
century. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2011.

The research by Sharon Erickson Nepstad (2011) applies Mill’s inductive method of
difference to isolate causal factors of successful regime change in nonviolent revolutions.
Nepstad measures success only if the regime in power is overthrown, not if there is a democratic
transition or a democratic procedure in its overthrow (Nepstad, 2011, p. xiv). She argues that by
focusing on techniques and strategies used by civilian resistance groups and regime elites, one is
better able isolate the specific factors influencing nonviolent political transformations. Nepstad’s
research seeks to determine which nonviolent actions exert the greatest influence in authoritarian
regimes. She also examines the various strategies of actors from both sides, the role of
international sanctions, and the factors that can derail a well-planned nonviolent revolt. She uses
six historical cases of civil unrest to answer these questions, arguing that defection of armed
security forces is the most important strategic factor to a successful nonviolent revolution. This
review provides a brief summary and critique of the findings in Nonviolent Revolutions: Civil
Resistance in the Late 20th Century.
The author applies the comparative method to six cases of domestic civil unrest during
the Cold War Era. She orders the cases by regime type, placing them in three separate categories
for analysis. Nepstad includes socialist regimes, military dictatorships, and personal dictatorships
in her study. Each category contains one case of successful regime overthrow and one failure.
The cases include the 1989 Chinese Tiananmen Square uprising and the 1989 East German
revolt for the socialist regime category, the regimes of General Manual Noriega in Panama
(1987-1989) and General Augusto Pinochet (1983-1988) of Chile in the military dictatorships
category, and the dictatorships of President Daniel arap’ Moi in Kenya in the late 1970s and
President Fernando Marcos (1968-1986) in the Philippines in the personal dictatorships category
(Nepstad, 2011, p. 17). Nepstad examines each of these cases using only secondary sources, and
while she acknowledges this as a research shortcoming, it does not weaken the author’s
conclusion. She succeeds in her goal of providing an analysis of the strategies and tactics in
nonviolent revolutions. She also creates noteworthy historical narratives of each case despite the
lack of primary sources.
Nepstad identifies five criteria that must be present for a revolutionary movement to
occur. There must be (1) widespread grievances against the state; (2) an allegiance shift in
national elites away from the state; (3) the mobilization of the public against regime injustices;
(4) public unification around an ideology of rebellion; and finally, (5) the mobilizing of
organizations (Nepstad, 2011, pp. 5-6). She examines both structural and strategic factors which
contribute to the success of nonviolent civil resistance. Structural factors are specific macro-level
indicators that contribute to the strength of a revolution. Four are present in each case: (1)
economic decline, (2) moral shock or new political opportunity, (3) divided elites, and (4) the
existence of a free space. Despite the presence of such structural factors in all of the cases she
examined, she argues that structural conditions are not all too relevant (a claim that is later
questioned in this review). She asserts instead that the strategic tactics used by individuals are
more important at influencing the outcome in a nonviolent revolution.
Applying Gene Sharp’s model of nonviolent resistance, she focuses on the six strategic
tactics often present in civilian resistance: (1) the refusal to acknowledge rulers as legitimate; (2)
the contestation of mentalities or ideologies of obedience; (3) the refusal to obey laws or
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cooperate with the state; (4) the withholding of skills to sustain state activities; (5) the
withdrawal of material resources; and (6) the undermining of a state’s sanctioning power.
Nepstad observes that the first three techniques were present in each case, while the success of
withholding of skills (4) and withdrawal of material resources (5) were mixed. The last
technique, undermining the state’s sanctioning power (6), was only present in the cases of
successful regime defeat. This strategic factor of undermining the state’s sanctioning power (6)
was present in the successes of Germany, Chile, and the Philippines and was absent in failures of
China, Panama, and Kenya. Importantly, the source of a regime’s ability to sanction comes from
the armed security forces of the state. Once these forces defect, the government and its rulers
lose the ability to coerce and punish the populace (Nepstad, 2011).
Of critical significance, then, is why armed security forces defect. Nepstad argues that
soldiers defect if they are convinced that the goals of the military more closely align with its
citizenry than the state. Defection can occur from the top-down or the bottom-up. In the case of
Chile, defection occurred from the top military offices in the junta, while in East Germany,
defection occurred from the lower ranks. The case of the Philippines saw a mix of high ranking
officials and subordinates defecting (Nepstad, 2011, p. 128). Importantly, once the process
occurs, says Nepstad, it begins a cascading effect through the ranks. Defection is even more
likely to occur when civil resisters remain nonviolent, the armed forces identify with the
protestors, soldiers question the morality of the orders, and soldiers see other soldiers defecting.
(Nepstad notes that in the unsuccessful cases of China and Kenya military troops were unable to
identify with resisters, and the soldiers were from different ethnicities and regions. As such, not
only were troops unlikely to defect, they were more likely to crack down on resisters.) Nepstad’s
analysis indicates that in all cases except China, religious institutions played a significant role in
the defection rates. For soldiers who respected a religious institution, carrying out the state’s
orders created a moral dilemma, increasing the likelihood of defection. Finally, says Nepstad,
once other troops were aware defection was occurring within their ranks, the other armed
security forces also defected (Nepstad, 2011).
Nepstad concludes by identifying factors that can undermine a nonviolent movement’s
ability to successfully overthrow a regime. She argues that a divided resistance, the inability to
remain nonviolent, and the backfiring of external sanctions all contribute to the failure of
nonviolent movements. In each unsuccessful case, at least two of these factors were present, and
all of these factors were absent in the successful cases (Nepstad, 2011, p. 131).
Despite the inclusion of six case studies, Nepstad’s research remains very focused,
providing a detailed analysis of the strategic factors involved in each case. This analysis,
however, comes at the expense of a detailed analysis of structural conditions. One of the null
hypotheses (or default assumptions) of this research is that structural conditions contribute to
regime overthrow. She isolates and discusses the four important structural conditions in each
case, but does not elaborate on their relevance in drawing her conclusions. The problem is that
all four structural conditions were present in each case, indicating that structural conditions
might be significant precursors to regime overthrow. Certainly, if some of the successful cases
were missing any of the structural conditions, it would strengthen the research’s conclusion
regarding the importance of security force defection. However, since all four structural
conditions are presence the study suffers from selection bias. Nepstad’s rejection of this null in
her conclusion might have led to a type I error, when the default is rejected when it is, in fact,
true. It is highly possible that structural conditions are essential precursors to successful regime
overthrow, and the absence of any structural condition would lead only to failure.
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One of the four structural factors in particular appears to be of specific relevance. Free
space, the fourth of the structural conditions Nepstad noted but did not consider critical to regime
change, may be one of the most important structural conditions in the cases analyzed. Religious
institutions, specifically the Christian Church, acted as a free space in every case study but
China. While Nepstad acknowledges this in her conclusion and discusses heavily the role of the
church, she does not provide much analysis on the operation of free space in nonviolent
revolutions. Free space plays vital role in the cases by giving resisters the opportunity to
organize, communicate, and facilitate their activities in a safe environment. Without free space,
these nonviolent revolutions might not have been able to mobilize the public or establish an
ideology of rebellion.
Nepstad’s research highlights important strategic elements to nonviolent revolutions. The
book is relevant, given the recent events of the Arab Spring, and it would be interesting if the
author applied the same methodology to these recent Middle Eastern cases. One conclusion that
Nepstad discusses briefly in her last chapter is the ineffectiveness of international sanctions in
overthrowing any regime. When powerful states like the US impose sanctions, doing so can have
the undesired effect of generating allies to the regime in power. Sanctions can also harm the
well-being of the general populace. Nepstad’s word of caution on the utilization of sanctions as
an international tactic should be heeded by the international community (Nepstad, 2011).
Nepstad’s research thoroughly analyzes the role of strategic techniques for successful
overthrow of a regime. However, while providing a detailed historical account and analysis of
the strategic factors, Nepstad fails to produce an equivalent analysis for structural conditions,
reducing some of the strength in her overall argument. Some political scientists and social
scientists will be disappointed by the lack of analysis of structural conditions; nonetheless, the
research offers some insight in predicting successful uprisings and the overthrow of regimes.
Insight that proves particularly timely given the recent trend of global uprisings.
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